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Valid Construals and/or Correct Readings? On the Symptomatology of Crises 
Bob Jessop 
 
To Posit or Not to Posit Crises? 
 
The Chinese ideogram for crisis combines two characters: danger and opportunity. This 
indicates the duality of crisis and suggests several important issues for current and future 
analyses of crisis, crisis construals, and crisis lessons. First, the ideogram signifies that crises 
have both objective and subjective aspects corresponding to danger and opportunity 
respectively. Building on Régis Debray, we can say that, objectively, crises occur when a set 
of social relations (including their ties to the natural world) cannot be reproduced (cannot “go 
on”) in the old way. Subjectively, crises tend to disrupt (even “shock”) accepted views of the 
world and create uncertainty on how to “go on” within it. For they threaten established views, 
practices, institutions, and social relations calling into question theoretical and policy 
paradigms as well as everyday personal and organizational routines. Second, in this sense, 
crises do not have predetermined outcomes: how they are resolved, if at all, depends on the 
actions taken in response to them. They are potentially path-shaping moments with 
performative effects that are mediated through the shifting balance of forces competing to 
influence crisis construal, crisis-management, crisis outcomes, and possible lessons to be 
drawn from crisis. Third, without the objective moment, we have, at worst, deliberately 
exaggerated or even manufactured “crises”, at best, unwarranted panic based on mis-perception 
or mis-recognition of real world events and processes.1 Sometimes, crises may be 
manufactured or, at least exaggerated, for strategic or tactical purposes not directly related to 
immediate events or processes. Agents may, for “political” motives, broadly interpreted, 
conjure crises from nowhere or exaggerate the breadth, depth, and threat of an actual crisis 
(Mirowski, 2013). After all, “one should never let a serious crisis go to waste” (cf. Rahm 
Emanuel’s comment, made on the Bloomberg television channel in November 2008 in his 
capacity as transition manager for President-elect Barack Obama).2 A rigorous analysis of 
crises, crisis construals, and crisis-management must be able to distinguish these alternatives 
or it could fall into a simplistic form of constructivism. Fourth, without the subjective moment, 
while disinterested observers may perceive a crisis developing either in real time or after the 
“event”, the crisis will have insufficient resonance for relevant participants to spur them into 
efforts to take decisive action. Yet the notion of critical moment and turning point is a key 
feature of crises as conventionally understood. Fifth, from this perspective, then, crises are 
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complex, objectively overdetermined moments of subjective indeterminacy, where decisive 
action can make a major difference to the future (Debray, 1973, p. 113; see also pp. 99-100, 
104-105). 
 
However, cautioning against too easy an adoption of this kind of perspective, Janet Roitman 
(2014, p. 41) notes that, while positing a given situation as a crisis makes certain questions 
possible, it also forecloses other kinds of question and lines of investigation. In other words, 
an over-reliance by participants or observers on interpreting specific symptoms as evidence of 
a continuing crisis or yet another crisis can create a blind spot that side-lines alternative 
descriptions, diagnoses, prognoses, and potential courses of action. Taking crisis for granted 
as a starting point means that the nature of crisis as an explanandum is left unexamined and 
therefore directs attention to the search for the best explanation (or, at least, some explanation). 
So, rather than asking whether X (an event or process) does or does not constitute a crisis, its 
unquestioned, unreflective treatment as a crisis, of whatever kind, short-circuits analysis of the 
crisis and, hence, decision-making about suitable responses. Although Roitman directs her 
criticism against historical narratives shaped by the interpretive couplet of crisis-critique that 
is allegedly characteristic of modernity since the eighteenth century (cf. Koselleck, 1988; Festl, 
Grosser, and Thomä, 2018), her arguments are also very apt for the inflation of crisis diagnoses 
and discourses in recent decades as mentioned in Chapter 1. 
 
Indeed, the more that crisis discourse expands, the greater the risk that crisis becomes an empty 
concept. This is especially true where crisis is employed counter-intuitively, as is often the case 
nowadays, to describe an enduring condition rather than, as implied in its original meaning, to 
identify a moment for decisive action that might restore the status quo ante or lead to more or 
less radical social transformation. This risk can be remedied on condition that the durability of 
crises is related to contingent conditions that block a resolution that might otherwise occur. 
This is compatible with the general principles of critical realism and is analysed by Gramsci, 
for example, in terms of a “catastrophic equilibrium of forces” (1971: 219-23, 300; cf. Gramsci 
1975: Q13, §27; Q14, §23; Q22, §10; for a discussion in relation to the crisis in Europe, see 
Keucheyan and Durand, 2015). These contingencies are illustrated in Chapter 4, where Andrew 
Gamble refers to the impasse of the British state or economy, which he regards as structural 
and deep-seated, leading to inertia, deadlocks or catastrophic equilibria. Likewise, Will Hout 
notes the permanent crisis in development assistance and explains this in terms of a failure to 
look beyond symptoms to deeper causes of poverty, inequality, and unsustainable 
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development. In a different context, more related to crisis construals than the objective 
overdetermination of crisis, enduring crises are especially likely where repeated critiques serve 
as substitutes for transformative action, which is an obvious temptation of intellectuals, and 
can lead to fatalism, cynicism, or stoicism (cf. Thomä, Festl, and Grosser, 2015, p. 17; 
Hindrichs, 2015). 
 
In contrast, writing some four decades earlier than Janet Roitman, Edgar Morin (1993 [1976]) 
advanced a transcendental argument about crises as an appropriate theoretical object for a full-
fledged “crisiology” (in French, crisologie), i.e., a sui generis theory of crisis. Whereas 
Roitman disputes the validity of crisis as an object of knowledge, Morin insists it can be. But 
this requires the crisiologist to locate crises in a precise theoretical framework in order to 
develop a general theory of crisis and corresponding praxis of crisis management. 
 
If one wants to move beyond conceiving crisis as perturbation, test, rupture in 
equilibrium, it is necessary to conceive society as a system capable of having crises, 
i.e., to pose three orders of principles, the first systemic, the second cybernetic, the 
third negative-entropy, without which the theory of society is inadequate and the 
notion of crisis inconceivable (Morin, 1976, p. 149, my translation; cf. 1993, p. 142). 
 
In this respect, Morin’s complements Roitman’s critique of the naturalization of crisis. He 
insists that to talk of crisis entails quite specific theoretical and real-world conditions. This can 
be related to the distinction noted in Chapter 1 between crises as “accidental” events (which 
can also be described as “disasters”) and crises as systemically generated events or processes 
based on specific structural contradictions, vulnerabilities, and crisis-tendencies. Both 
perspectives reviewed above are pertinent to a critical crisiology. For, whereas Roitman 
cautions against unreflective categorization and explanation of surprising or anomalous events 
and processes as “crises”, Morin aims to specify the conditions in which it would be 
theoretically appropriate to categorize them as crises and seek to explain them as such. 
However, as we shall see, it is one thing to posit the abstract possibility of particular types of 
crisis or even the abstract possibility of a general crisiology; it is another thing entirely to 
explain the concrete form, substantive features, location, timing, and so forth, of specific crises. 
 
This said, assuming that it makes sense to posit crisis as a valid object of inquiry in certain 
circumstances, one must recognize that crisis is a polysemic word and a problematic concept. 
4 
 
It denotes multi-faceted phenomena that invite analysis from different entry-points and 
standpoints. Hence, the theoretical significance of crisis depends on how it is articulated into a 
broader set of (preferably commensurable) concepts and on the sort of meta-theoretical 
framework in which the concept is embedded. Karim Knio explored the issue of the theoretical 
compatibility of different sets of concepts in Chapter 2. For example, constructivist accounts 
emphasize the constitutive role of discourse in identifying and shaping responses to crisis. 
Empiricist accounts analyse crises in terms of superficial features based on obvious external 
feature of crises, such as their sectoral, regional, financial, fiscal character, their intensity or 
duration or on statistical differences (e.g., crises with V-shaped, W-shaped, or L-shaped 
recoveries, i.e., a sharp drop and quick recovery, double-dip crises, and secular stagnation 
respectively.3 This approach is then used to generate taxonomies, produce empirical 
generalizations about different taxa, or even to develop invariant laws of cause and effect. 
Another approach can be described, in critical realist terms, as “actualist”. This tends to 
associate particular (sets of) symptoms with particular (sets of) causes. In the case of economic 
crises, for example, these causes might be irrational exuberance, excessive state interference 
with market forces, Minsky’s financial instability hypothesis, the real business cycle, etc. In 
contrast with critical realism, then, actualism starts from crisis symptoms and moves directly 
to explain them in terms of corresponding prior sequences of events or causal processes. This 
is often associated with a chronological narrative approach or simplistic cause-effect analyses. 
In contrast, critical realist analyses start from symptoms and then inquire systematically into 
potential underlying real causal mechanisms, complete with their respective tendencies and 
counter-tendencies, and ask how these interacted in specific initial conditions to generate these 
particular symptoms as their contingently necessary outcome (see Sayer, 1992). 
 
Once more: Crisis, what crisis? 
 
Critical realism is an appropriate meta-theoretical framework for analysing the objective 
overdetermination of crises as events or processes. But it does not provide the specific 
conceptual and theoretical tools for exploring specific cases of crisis (cf. the argument in 
Jessop, 2015). For there is no crisis in general or general crisis: only particular crises of 
particular sets of social relations and, perhaps, the totality of crises in a given conjuncture. This 
requires specific critical realist theoretical frameworks with corresponding substantive 
concepts rather than a general invocation of the virtues of critical realism in general vis-à-vis 




Crisis is also an inherently temporal concept with spatial connotations. The concept implies 
that time unfolds unevenly, with continuities and discontinuities, transition points and ruptures, 
with scope for irreversible change rather than simple iteration, hence scope for path-shaping 
alongside path-dependence. “[T]ime moves faster in periods of crisis, and stagnates in times of 
regression” (Debray, 1973, p. 90). This indicates an important uncertainty in the crisis concept: 
is it a single event (and, if so, how would one identify its beginning and its conclusion), a 
contingent series of events distributed in time and space that are connected, if at all, because 
of earlier crisis responses that could have taken a different turn with different effects, or a series 
of events with an underlying tendential logic that therefore unfold as a relatively predictable 
process (if only from the perspective of informed observers)?4 
 
A crisis is never a purely objective, extra-semiotic event or process that automatically produces 
a definite response or outcome. Crises do not generate their own resolution, even where trusted 
crisis-management routines exist; on the contrary, crises of given sets of social relations, 
especially where form-determined, often need relatively long, discursively, institutionally, 
technologically (in a Foucauldian sense), and agentially mediated search processes before a 
new, relatively durable order based on new institutional and spatio-temporal fixes allows 
movement beyond such a crisis. Without subjective indeterminacy, there is no crisis – merely 
chaos, disaster, or catastrophe and, perhaps, fatalism or stoicism in the face of the inevitable. 
In this sense, crises are a potential moment of decisive intervention, where, rather than 
muddling through, resolute action may repair broken social relations, promote piecemeal 
adaptation, or produce radical transformation. 
 
In the light of these remarks, it is useful to classify crises on two dimensions (cf. chapter 1). 
The first concerns their aetiology. On the one hand, some crises appear “accidental”, that is, 
are readily (if sometimes inappropriately) attributable to natural or “external” forces (for 
example, a volcanic eruption, tsunami, crop failure, invasion). When these have significant 
effects, they may be termed “disasters” (Quarantelli, 1988). This distinguishes them from 
crises that are rooted in crisis-tendencies or antagonisms grounded in specific structural forms 
(for example, profit-oriented, market-mediated capital accumulation). In other words, they 
result from the inherent crisis potentials and crisis tendencies of a given social form and may 
have corresponding patterns of crisis-management. This may require attention to systemic 
contradictions, structurally grounded antagonisms, and social conflicts without assuming that 
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every crisis derives therefrom. This distinction does not imply that accidental crises lack causes 
– just that these are so varied, individually or in their interaction, that they are harder to recover 
in a systematic manner. This said, external, coincidental, incidental causes may trigger 
structural or systemic crises by working “through the intermediary of the internal, structural, 
essential causes that constitute the determining element in society’s crises” (Debray, 1973, pp. 
101-2). In this regard, they would not be accidental because they have a primary causal 
mechanism that is expressed in very diverse ways. This poses interesting empirical challenges 
to identify this mechanism amid a wide and disparate range of circumstantial factors. 
 
The second dimension concerns the significance of crises in terms of their potential impact on 
the simple or expanded reproduction of the relevant “order” or “system”, including its typical 
modes of reproduction, its conditions of existence, and its relative embedding in a wider social 
formation. Such reproduction in the social world depends on the reproduction of the social 
relations that support the relevant “order” or “system” – relations that can be contradictory, 
conflictual, or antagonistic (the capitalist mode of production is an obvious example). On the 
one hand, crises “in” are normal (expected). They occur within the parameters of a given 
natural environment and/or set of social arrangements. There are also well-developed routines 
for dealing with accidental crises, reducing subjective indeterminacy. These are reflected and 
systematized in a large practical literature on how to respond to accidents and emergencies, 
whether these be natural disasters, large-scale accidents, or reputational damage to companies, 
organizations, and governments (Farazmand, 2001). Indeed, repeated observation of “normal” 
disasters, accidents, and crises, leaning about and from recurrent crises may encourage 
monitoring, risk management, disaster education and preparedness, rehabilitation, and the 
sharing of best practice (Kirschenbaum, 2004; Pinkowski, 2008) such that subjective 
indeterminacy is reduced. This could mean that crisis-management has become so routinized 
that a ‘crisis’ no longer exists even when objective crisis symptoms are present because there 
is no subjective moment since the symptoms merely trigger a “here we go again” response. 
Instead the basic features of disturbed arrangements are routinely restored through internal 
adjustments and/or shift crisis effects into the future, elsewhere, or onto marginal and 
vulnerable groups. This is exemplified in alternating phases of unemployment and inflation in 





Crises “of” are less common. They occur when there is a crisis of crisis-management (that is, 
normal responses no longer work) and efforts to defer or displace crises encounter growing 
resistance. Crisis of crisis-management is a term introduced by Claus Offe (1984). He did so 
to denote potential second-order effects of established economic crisis-management routines, 
manifested in the displacement of crisis tendencies from the economic into extra-economic 
spheres (e.g., fiscal crisis, administrative crisis). Similar ideas are found in Habermas (1975) 
regarding rationality, legitimation and motivational crises. This displacement implies that 
crisis-tendencies remain incompressible but have different forms of appearance linked to 
different institutional and spatio-temporal fixes and to different crisis-management routines. 
This is a heuristically insightful notion and deserves broader use in deal with crisis dynamics. 
For example, an additional factor in crises of crisis-management is shifts in the balance of 
forces that may intensify crisis-tendencies by weakening or resisting established modes of 
crisis-management. 
 
One reason that crises of crisis-management occur is that crises are overdetermined, i.e., they 
result from the interaction of different crisis-tendencies in complex conjunctures, so no crisis 
in all its complex overdetermination is ever self-identical with previous actualizations of the 
same crisis-tendency. Thus crisis-management routines that worked in the past may no longer 
be effective in different circumstances. For, whatever the universal features of crisis-tendencies 
in any given system (e.g., the capitalist mode of production), the particular features of any 
particular set of crisis-tendencies associated with a particular type of crisis (e.g., 
overproduction, underconsumption, disproportions, tendency of the rate of profit to fall, credit 
crisis, fiscal crisis, sovereign debt crisis), no algorithm, even if based on learning in, about, and 
from crisis, would be cognitively inadequate in the face of the singularity of the crisis, which, 
therefore, remains subjectively indeterminate. 
 
Crises of crisis-management are more disorienting than crises “in” specific structures or 
systems, indicating the breakdown of previous regularities and an inability to “go on managing 
crises in the old way”. In certain regards, one might consider these as crises in/of crisis-
management. The prepositional ambivalence of “in/of” reflects the prospective as opposed to 
retroductive character of crisis construal, with the latter more suited to scientific analysis, the 
former more dependent on speculative bets about the future and, a fortiori, whether crisis-
management routines are irretrievably broken or open to piecemeal reform. This reflects the 
open nature of social systems and the scope for human agency (as well as the non-linear 
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interaction of non-agential causal mechanisms) to make a difference to the future. This opens 
space for strategic interventions to significantly redirect the course of events rather than 
“muddling through” until the crisis is eventually resolved or hoping that the “business as usual” 
can be restored through emergency measures (see below). This poses a whole series of 
counterfactual epistemological problems about crisis construal and the asymmetry, emphasized 
in critical realism, between explanation and prediction. More generally, crises of crisis 
management can cause social stasis or regression, attempts to restore the old system by force 
majeure, fraud, or corruption; efforts at more radical social innovation for good or ill, leading 
in some cases to temporary states of emergency or more enduring exceptional regimes (for 
example, military dictatorship, fascism), or to efforts to break the power of such regimes. 
 
This classification could be misleading if it were to one-sidedly highlight the objective aspect 
of crisis. A crisis is never a purely objective, extra-semiotic event or process that automatically 
produces a definite response or outcome. The objective moment of crisis becomes socially and 
historically relevant through the moment of subjective indeterminacy. This denotes the absence 
of an algorithm that unambiguously identifies the correct response to the crisis on the basis of 
its objective features, i.e., the absence of a self-evident way to restore simple or expanded 
reproduction or to move smoothly to another stable “order” or “system”. The subjectively 
indeterminate response set includes non-decision or non-intervention – which, given the 
objective nature of crisis, also has system-relevant effects and is therefore a mode of decision 
and intervention. Ideas and imaginaries6 shape the interpretation. A rigorous analysis of crises, 
crisis construals, and crisis-management must be able to distinguish these alternatives or fall 
into a simplistic form of constructivism. 
 
The importance of subjective indeterminacy also poses the question of the resonance of crisis 
construals and responses, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, their material adequacy to 
the objective character of the crisis, multiple crises, or interaction among different kinds of 
crisis. This is a source of massive practical as well as theoretical problems in analysing and 
managing crises. A crisis is also a moment for contestation and struggle to construe it and 
inform individual and collective responses. Interpretations can range from denial (“nothing to 
see here”) through claims of a major break (“tipping” or “turning” points) to a more radical 






The relationship between objective overdetermination and subjective indeterminacy poses the 
question of how to interpret or construe crisis symptoms. This is the challenge of 
symptomatology, i.e., of establishing the contingently necessary relation between actual 
symptoms and underlying causal mechanisms. I relate this to disputes over the nature of crises, 
especially whether they are crises “in” a relevant order or crises “of” that order, which would 
require fundamental change. Another key feature of the subjective indeterminacy of crises 
concerns “what is to be done?” Here I distinguish between situations where established crisis-
management routines can plausibly overcome challenges and restore order and those where a 
crisis in crisis-management requires a rethinking of crisis-management approaches or more 
radical change in the relevant system, complex, or social configuration. This is related to the 
asymmetry between attempts to develop an adequate account of the objective 
overdetermination of a crisis (if such it be) and the challenge of reading what exists in potentia 
in a crisis conjuncture and could be realized through appropriate strategies. For crisis-
management and crisis reactions often involve speculative bets on an indeterminate future such 
that crisis construals and responses are performative – creating as yet unrealized possibilities 
or, conversely, aggravating contradictions, antagonisms, and conflicts. This has important 
implications for whether crises are managed to restore something resembling the status quo 
ante or seized as an opportunity “not to be wasted” for social transformation. 
 
Discussion of crises often invokes the medical metaphor of crisis symptoms and the scope for 
decisive interventions into the course of an illness to cure it or, at least, minimize its effects. 
The key question is “what must the patient’s mind-body (and her world) be like for these 
symptoms to appear?” Such retroductive questions are characteristic of critical realism. In the 
social world, the corresponding question is “what must the social (and natural) world be like 
for these crisis symptoms to appear?” This is an almost too easy comparison. However, less 
attention is paid to how actors and observers can decipher the causes of a non-medical crisis 
based on its symptoms and, where relevant, decide on whether, when, and how to intervene. 
To address this question, I employ a cultural political economy (CPE) approach that is informed 
by critical realism and shaped by a concern with the emancipatory potentials (as well as with 
the negative and often repressive consequences) of crisis (for the general approach, see Sum 
and Jessop 2013). CPE integrates research on sense- and meaning-making into the analysis of 
the basic features of capital accumulation, including its contradictions, crisis-tendencies, and 
crisis dynamics. But its general approach to the differential articulation of semiosis and 
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structuration can be applied far beyond the critique of political economy. The dual character of 
crisis means that struggles over crisis construal shape the nature and relative success, if any, of 
efforts at crisis-management, depending on whether or not the construals are substantively 
adequate to dealing satisfactorily with complex crises (typically by providing suitable ways of 
reducing their complexity as a basis for decisive action rather than waiting for more 
information at the risk of things getting worse or, perhaps, waiting optimistically for 
“something to turn up”) and, consequently, providing suitable responses for at least some key 
actors affected by the crisis. An important aspect of this process is the nature of learning in, 
through and from crisis, whether  from previous crises, which might guide adequate responses 
to current crises, or during current crises in real time with possible lessons for future crisis 
events or processes. 
 
This raises the question of how to distinguish among the phenomenal forms of crisis and 
underlying causes and causal connections, the contingent trigger events – often external – that 
reveal crisis, and the more internal, structural factors that make crisis necessary. The 
disjunction between objective and subjective aspects also has implications about the longue 
durée, secular crisis tendencies, and the immediacy of crisis “events”. In particular, it suggests 
a tendency to focus on immediate symptoms rather than causes that have operated over longer-
term time and/or more extensive socio-spatial horizons. These are often entangled and require 
correspondingly complex periodizations in terms of interwoven temporalities and/or complex 
socio-spatial analyses reflecting the substantive causal mechanisms at play. This also reveals 
the Janus-faced nature of crisis – that is, the possibility (and necessity) of interpreting their 
historically overdetermined aetiology for the purposes of diagnosis and evaluating current 
possibilities of intervention with a view to prognosis and potentially decisive intervention to 
change the future in terms of conjunctural possibilities. 
 
While crises become visible through symptoms, these have no one-to-one relation to crisis-
tendencies and specific conjunctures. This explains the subjective indeterminacy that attends 
the objective overdetermination of crisis. Thus economic ‘symptomatology’ challenges the 
interpretive capacity of social agents just as medical symptoms challenge the knowledge and 
skills of physicians and surgeons. In both cases, of course, there are competing schools and 
interpretive paradigms (on competing schools in medicine, see Jessop, 2015). This is why 
crises are moments of profound cognitive and strategic disorientation. They disturb inherited 
expectations and practices; challenge dominant paradigms and produce radical uncertainty; 
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undermine faith in past lessons and ways of learning; open space for new lessons and ways of 
learning; and provide the context for struggles over the right way forward. 
 
One way to address the challenge of symptomatology is to appropriate (and transform) the 
distinction, introduced by St Augustine in De Doctrina Christiana (Augustine of Hippo, 389 
AD [1995]), between signa data and signa naturalia. He writes that ‘a sign is something which, 
offering itself to the senses, conveys something other to the intellect’.7 In this context, signa 
data largely comprise words, that is, the conventional linguistic relationship explored by 
Saussureans and social constructivists in terms of signum (sign) and signans (signifier). Signa 
data (sign-signifier relations) are used intentionally to convey a particular meaning.8 In 
contrast, signa naturalia are natural, indexical signs that can be interpreted as symptoms of 
something beyond the signum-signans relation. Thus, St Augustine writes: ‘Natural signs are 
those which, apart from any intention or desire of using them as signs, do yet lead to the 
knowledge of something else, as, for example, smoke when it indicates fire’ (389 AD, Book 2, 
chapter 1). They are symptoms of an underlying reality, outward manifestations of some other 
fact, internal condition, quality, or overall state of affairs (cf. Favareau, 2006). Other examples 
of natural signs that he gives are animal tracks and an angry or sorrowful countenance (insofar 
as it is an unintended expression of inner feelings). Elsewhere he interprets some events as 
natural signs of the impending end of the world (Dyson, 2005, p. 46). The same temptation is 
found, of course, in contemporary catastrophist readings of crisis symptoms. To St Augustine’s 
examples we can add symptoms of disease in medical diagnosis (linked to the medical notion 
of crisis) and those of economic crisis (and the attendant problems of interpreting their causal 
link to economic crisis-tendencies). Having mentioned these examples, St Augustine focuses 
on conventional signs and the hermeneutic problems of scriptural interpretation. This is where 
we must part company with him and return to signa naturalia. 
 
St Augustine posits an objective relationship (or causal nexus) that connects an invisible entity 
to the visible signs that it produces. Nonetheless this relationship is not immediately transparent 
or self-evident but requires interpretation because there is no one-to-one relation between event 
and symptom. It is underdetermined. No algorithm can establish the cause (though expert 
systems with fuzzy logic may attempt to narrow down possible causes) and this poses a whole 
series of problems about causal interactions, infinite regress in time and infinite egress in space, 
and issues of attribution (including blame and responsibility). If we read symptoms as 
signifiers, then we can ask what is being signified and what is its referent? In these terms, crises 
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can be seen as stratified. Adopting critical realist language, we can say that they are generated 
by real mechanisms, they are actual events or processes, and they have evidential symptoms. 
This invites the question: what must the real world be like for this event to have occurred and/or 
these symptoms to exist? Thus, the challenge is to relate the empirical symptoms, actual crisis, 
and underlying mechanisms as a basis for possible decisive interventions. This is the field of 
‘symptomatology’. It is based on trial-and-error observation and construal that draws on past 




Moving beyond these remarks and thinking about crisis construal more generally, construals 
can be assessed in three ways. The first is in terms of their scientific validity, i.e., their 
conformity with prevailing scientific procedures and rules of evaluation. The second is in terms 
of the narrative plausibility of a given construal in identifying and explaining the (symptoms 
of) crisis relative to the prevailing discourses in circulation among relevant social forces. The 
third is in terms of the pragmatic correctness of construals, i.e., their ability to read a 
conjuncture, discern potential futures, provide a plausible narrative, and guide action that 
transforms the conjuncture (Lecercle, 2006).  
 
In a crude way, these distinctions correspond to the explanation of past events and processes 
leading to the present conjuncture, a narrative account that builds on a specific construal of the 
past to describe the present and draw conclusions for the future; and a speculative prediction 
coupled with prescriptions for action about what might be achievable when crisis is taken as 
an opportunity. These criteria involve different epistemological judgements. Scientific validity 
depends on specific protocols of investigation and acknowledges that conclusions may be 
fallible. Narrative plausibility depends on rules of argumentation oriented to persuasion rather 
than apodictic truth. In this context, while scientific argument has its rhetorical features, these 
should be subordinate to scientific analysis; conversely, the plausibility of crisis narratives may 
be enhanced by reference to facts, but these are selected to lend credibility to the overall 
narrative with the result that the factual elements are less rigorous and comprehensive and will 
often screen out inconvenient details.9 Pragmatically correct construals are epistemologically 
different again because they involve what currently exists (if at all) only in potentia, may never 
be actualized, and cannot therefore be analysed in the same ways as the past and present. At 
stake here, then, is the distinction between the explanation of past and present events, processes 
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or conjunctures and the prediction of the future of open systems where development depends 
on the strategic and tactical choices of diverse actors and social forces. Here prediction is 
related not just to the objective indeterminacy of the future but also – crucially – to the agents’ 
differential capacity to shape their future through actions and inactions. 
 
The validity of scientific explanation depends on scientific procedures and rules of evaluation 
according to specific scientific programmes and paradigms. At stake here is crisis considered 
as an external, objective phenomenon that is subject to first-order observation by third parties 
of its origins, course, and potential resolution. Crisis construals may address a more or less 
broad range of questions. This involves, among other issues, delimiting the origins of a crisis 
in space-time and its uneven spatio-temporal incidence and development; identifying rightly 
or wrongly purported causes (agential, structural, discursive, and technical) at different scales, 
over different time horizons, in different fields of social practice, and at different levels of 
social organization from nameless or named individuals through social networks, formal 
organizations, institutional arrangements, specific social forms, or even the dynamic of a global 
society; determining its scope and effects, assessing in broad terms whether it is a crisis ‘in’ or 
‘of’ the relevant arrangements; reducing its complexities to identifiable causes that could be 
targeted to find solutions; charting alternative futures; and promoting specific lines of action 
for socially identified forces over differently constructed spatio-temporal horizon. 
 
Scientific validity does not require a full explanation of an overdetermined event or process. 
Provided they have some basis in the objectively overdetermined nature of the crisis, different 
scientific readings may reduce its complexity by selectively construing some aspects of its 
objective features as important, while others are marginalized, ignored, or remain invisible. 
The objective overdetermination and subjective indeterminacy create a space for plausible 
alternative contested readings of a crisis within specific limits. This does not imply that 
scientific accounts are always accurate. Scientific inquiries are distorted by scientists’ own 
ideological assumptions. Thus, in addition to the cognitive limits related to the scientific 
legibility of a crisis for differently situated observers using different methods of investigation, 
construals may also reflect specific ideal and material interests of these observers as revealed 
through the critique of ideology and/or domination. This is, of course, a standing criticism of 
the attempts of orthodox economists to explain the recurrence of economic crises (see, for 







Scientific explanations have their logic but may lack narrative plausibility for those directly or 
indirectly affected by “the crisis” or charged with responding to it. Narratives have a different 
structure from scientific explanations. They emplot selected past events and forces in terms of 
a temporal sequence with a beginning, middle, and end in the form of a story that embodies 
causal and moral lessons. The plausibility of narratives and other construals and their 
associated crisis-management solutions (including inaction) depends on their resonance with 
(or capacity to reinterpret and mobilize) key social forces. For example, neo-liberals narrated 
how trade union power and the welfare state undermined economic growth in the 1970s and 
called for more market, less state. The Tea Party and Occupy Wall Street movements offer 
different narratives about the recent crisis and reach radically different conclusions. Narratives 
play a key role in strategic action because they can simplify complex problems, identify simple 
solutions, connect to common sense and mobilize popular support. To be effective in the long 
run, however, they should correspond to the objective conditions and the real possibilities of 
action. Yet strategies based on “inorganic” narratives, however, can have adverse path-shaping 
effects, making recovery from a crisis harder or shifting its forms and consequences. 
 
Although many plausible narratives may be advanced, their narrators will not be equally 
effective in conveying their messages and securing support for the proposed solutions. 
Powerful resonance does not mean these construals and solutions should be taken at face value. 
All narratives are selective, appropriate some arguments, and combine them in specific ways. 
So, we must also consider what goes unstated or silent, repressed or suppressed, in specific 
discourses. Interpretive power depends on the “web of interlocution” (Somers, 1994) in 
different fields and its discursive selectivities, the organization and operation of the mass 
media, the role of intellectuals in public life, and the structural biases and strategically selective 
operations of various public and private apparatuses of economic, political, and ideological 
domination. This is mainly an issue of political contestation, broadly interpreted. 
 
An important distinction here concerns interpretive power and interpretive authority (cf. 
Heinrich and Jessop, 2014). The former refers to differences in the ability of social forces to 
identify and construe urgent social problems and translate these into policies, successful or not, 
intended to address maintain or transform the world. This is not so much a question of having 
15 
 
the best scientific analyses and most persuasive arguments as it is one of having the capacities 
to act upon a given interpretation, which also involves access to key decision-making 
structures, the availability of appropriate governmental technologies, and the ability to mobilize 
sufficient support to make a difference in a particular conjuncture. Interpretive authority is 
narrower in scope but sometimes more significant in practice. It refers to the legal instance or 
authority with the legal right to interpret the law in a given juridico-political context and 
translate that interpretation into policy. This is especially important regarding the right to 
declare a state of emergency (e.g., military, political, or economic) and authorize exceptional 
crisis-management measures. More generally, this distinction shows the limits of a purely 
constructivist approach to crisis management that somehow forgets that institutions matter too. 
This poses issues about the narrative plausibility of scientific explanations and/or extra-




Whereas scientific validity concerns the genealogy of the crisis as an event and/or continuing 
process, pragmatic correctness is judged in the light of future developments, including 
counterfactual analysis, and depends on social agents’ ability to read present and future 
conjunctures in terms of what exists in potentia and how it might be realized. I now elaborate 
these remarks. Plausible narratives are typically an important moment of pragmatic correctness. 
 
It is one thing to identify the real causes of actual crisis symptoms as a basis for crisis 
management intended to restore the status quo ante and/or to stabilize the situation. It is another 
to decide on possible courses of more radical transformative action in response to crisis. This 
requires moving beyond a strictly scientific programme to consider the emancipatory (or other) 
potentials present in a given crisis conjuncture, which involves thinking crisis in counterfactual 
terms. This brings us to the moment of pragmatic correctness. This aspect is mediated through 
language as well as through social practices and institutions beyond language. Indeed, since 
the development of print media at least, crisis construal is heavily mediatized, depending on 
specific forms of visualization and media representations, which nowadays typically vary 
across popular, serious, and specialist media. Pragmatic correctness depends on: (1) the 
strategically selective limits to action set by the objectively overdetermined form of a crisis 
conjuncture; (2) the interpretive and mobilizing power of crisis construals and strategic 
perspectives – notably its ready communicability to relevant audiences – which affects the 
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capacities of strategic forces to win hegemony; and (3) the balance of forces associated with 
different construals or, at least, the ability of some forces to impose their preferred construals, 
crisis-management options, and exit solutions (Lecercle, 2006, pp. 40-41; Debray, 1973, pp. 
106-7; and, on the analysis of the first limit, Patomäki, 2008).10 
 
Considered in these terms, to paraphrase Gramsci, ‘there is a world of difference between 
conjunctural analyses [he writes of ideologies] that are arbitrary, rationalistic, and willed and 
those that are organic’ (Gramsci, 1971, 376-7; 1975, Q7§19, p. 868). The former analyses 
misconstrue the crisis – minimizing or exaggerating its scale and scope and its system-
threatening qualities – and misidentify necessary or feasible solutions. An organic analysis is 
an at least minimally adequate analysis of the objective dimensions of the crisis and its 
manageability or transformability in terms of a possible attenuation of crisis symptoms, 
muddling through, displacement or deferral, etc. and in terms of the correlation of forces and 
the strategic horizons of action of the social forces whose ideal and material interests it 
represents. This raises the key issue of the (always limited and provisional) fit between 
imaginaries and real, or potentially realizable, sets of material interdependencies in the real 
world. Proposed crisis strategies and policies must be (or seen to be) effective within the spatio-
temporal horizons of relevant social forces in a given social order. 
 
In all cases, how a crisis is managed has path-shaping effects: responses affect the manner in 
which subsequent crises will develop. This corresponds to the idea that crises are moments 
where a decisive intervention can mark a turning point in the progress of a disease or other 
critical conjuncture. Furthermore, even scientifically invalid and/or conjuncturally incorrect 
construals, when translated into responses, will have constitutive or constructive effects. In 
many cases what is ‘correct’ organically and chronologically (being first to resonate and/or to 
impose agreed reading) matters more in selection than ‘scientific truth’. 
 
Indeed, a ‘correct’ reading creates its own ‘truth-effects’ and may then be retained thanks to 
its capacity to shape reality. Getting consensus on an interpretation about which of different 
aspects of a crisis or, alternatively, which of several interlocking crises matters is to have 
framed the problem (variation). Nonetheless this consensus must be translated into coherent, 
coordinated policy approach and solutions that match objective dimensions of the crisis 
(selection). Effective policies adapt crisis-management routines and/or discover new routines 
through trial-and-error experimentation and can be consolidated as the basis of new forms of 
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governance, meta-governance, and institutionalized compromise (retention). Only crisis 
construals that grasp key emergent extra-semiotic features of the social world as well as mind-
independent features of the natural world are likely to be selected and retained. Effective 
construals therefore also have constructive force and produce changes in the extra-semiotic 
features of the world and in related (always) tendential real mechanisms and social logics. 
 
As Friedman’s observation reminds us, those affected by crisis typically disagree both on their 
objective and subjective aspects because of their different entry-points, standpoints, and 
capacities to read the crisis. The system-specific and conjunctural aspects of crises have many 
spatio-temporal complexities and affect social forces in quite varied ways. The lived experience 
of crisis is necessarily partial, limited to particular social segments of time-space. So, it is hard 
to read crises. Indeed, if spatiotemporal boundaries are uncertain, if causes and effects are 
contested, can we speak of THE CRISIS?  As Gramsci noted, writing on the Great Depression: 
 
Whoever wants to give one sole definition of these events, or what is the same thing, 
find a single cause or origin, must be rebutted. We are addressing a process that shows 
itself in many ways, and in which causes and effects become intertwined and mutually 
entangled. To simplify means to misrepresent and falsify. … When did the crisis 
begin? This question is bound up with the first since we are dealing with a process and 
not an event … It is hard in real terms to separate the economic crisis from the political 
and ideological ones, etc. (1995: 219; cf. Gramsci, 1975, Q15, §5).11 
 
Resolving a crisis into one essential crisis, let alone one with one main cause, involves at best 
strategic essentialism12 rather than rigorous scientific practice. This said, simplifications may 
be necessary to begin to respond to a crisis when its character is as yet unclear, but its 
immediate effects are serious and wide-ranging. Actors do not always have the luxury of 
postponing action until the nature of the crisis becomes evident – even refusing to act could 
alter its dynamic as process (as opposed to event) and a judicious “wait-and-see” approach, 
considered or nonchalant, may well enable others to fill a strategic, political, or policy void 
with path-shaping consequences. Thus, simplifications may be correct in the circumstances – 
they may help to create suitable conditions to learn lessons and take effective action. This is 
why a critical realist, CPE approach needs to consider how different actors or social forces 
learn in, about, and from crisis – especially as the symptoms and causes of crisis (not the 
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CRISIS) will affect them differently in space-time as well as in relation to identities, interests, 
and values.  
 
Often, wider ideational and institutional innovation going beyond the economy narrowly 
conceived is needed, promoted and supported by political, intellectual and moral leadership. 
Indeed, as Milton Friedman put it hyperbolically but tellingly: “[o]nly a crisis produces real 
change. When that crisis occurs, the actions that are taken depend on the ideas that are lying 
around” (1965, p. 32). It follows that preparing the ground for crisis-induced strategic 
interventions helps to shape the nature and outcome of crisis-management and crisis responses. 
Inadequate preparation (for whatever cause) makes it harder to influence struggles over crisis-
construal and crisis-management, even if the eventual crisis construal is “organic”. Magnus 
Ryner’s chapter in this volume illustrates the problems that arise when crisis construals are 
more fantasmagoric than organic; and Angela Wigger demonstrates this in her chapter 
regarding EU industrial policy strategies, where previous lessons on competitiveness strategy 
went unheeded. 
 
The Pedagogy of Crisis 
 
Another important aspect of crisiology is the pedagogy of crises, i.e., learning in and from 
crises and drawing lessons for future crises. This provides the basis for a fourfold distinction 
between past lessons being thrown into crisis, learning in crisis, learning about crisis, and 
learning from crisis (see Ji 2006; Jessop 2015; Sum & Jessop 2013; and Table 1). In brief, the 
first term indicates the disorienting effects of crisis on expectations and routines, rooted in past 
lessons. The others merit more extended but still necessarily limited discussion. This implies 
that crises are moments for critical reflexion that leads to unlearning past lessons together with 
learning in, about and from crisis and, in this context, for theoretical, policy, and practical 
innovation. These processes affect different actors or social forces in different ways and are 
often deeply contested and different actors and social forces may traverse these analytical 
distinct (but potentially overlapping) stages in different ways.  This occurs in part because the 
crisis affects them differently in space-time as well as in relation to their different identities, 
interests, and values. 
 
Learning can be instrumental (including successful muddling through), critical (or counter-
critical), or emancipatory. Its goals and potentially transformative effects matter especially for 
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policy and strategic learning in the face of crises (including crises of crisis-management). Just 
as medical diagnosis requires knowledge about the relation between symptoms and underlying 
causes based on careful observation, trial-and-error experimentation, and successful 
retroduction (i.e., asking what the world must be like for ‘x’ to happen), so does the correct 
diagnosis of crisis symptoms in the social world and their translation into effective ‘treatment’ 
of the crisis or, at least, useful lessons for future attempts at crisis-management. For, while 
crises become visible through their symptoms, the latter have no one-to-one relation to crisis-
tendencies and specific conjunctures. Thus, both social and medical crises, the relation between 
symptom and generative mechanisms is grounded in a causal nexus that connects an invisible 
entity to the visible signs it produces. This explains the subjective indeterminacy that attends 
the objective overdetermination of the crisis. 
 
The following remarks distinguish for analytical purposes between those affected directly or 
indirectly by the crisis as it unfolds and those who are not so affected, either because they are 
studying past crises to draw lessons for the present or future and/or because they are motivated 
by disinterested curiosity in the nature of past or present crises (for example, to compare and 
contrast crisis dynamics in different contexts for scientific purposes in order to understand and 
explain crisis-tendencies as neutral observers). 
 
Learning in crisis occurs in the immediacy of crisis, considered as a moment of profound 
disorientation, and is oriented to the phenomenal forms of crisis. For those directly affected, it 
occurs via direct experience (Erlebnis) of its phenomenal forms. Lived experience will vary 
across persons, groups, organizations. Thus, the first phases of a crisis generally prompt 
massive variation in construals. Many early accounts disappear in the cacophony of competing 
interpretations or lack meaningful connections to the salient phenomenal forms of the crisis. 
This holds for religious readings of the crisis as signs of divine retribution for moral 
degeneration, for example, and for the equally fanciful claim that the terminal crisis of 
capitalism had arrived. Significant shifts can also occur in hegemonic imaginaries. Alan 
Greenspan, former Chair of the US Federal Reserve, for example, famously conceded that the 
NAFC had led him to identify ‘flaws’ in the operating ideology that he had used to steer the 
US economy: namely, the efficient market hypothesis (Greenspan 2008). For those not directly 
affected, learning in crisis occurs through real time observation of the phenomenal forms of 
crisis. This is often mediated through diverse forms of representation (serious and tabloid 
journalism, statistics, charts, econometric models, reports, etc.) and can be highly mediatized. 
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In neither case does such learning dig beneath surface phenomena to deeper causes, crisis-
tendencies, etc. 
 
Learning in crisis occurs in the immediacy of crisis, considered as a moment of profound 
disorientation, and is oriented to the phenomenal forms of crisis. For those directly affected, it 
occurs via direct experience of its phenomenal forms. Lived experience varies across persons, 
groups, organizations. How a person experiences and understands his/her world(s) as real and 
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meaningful depends on their subject positions and standpoint. Organizations also have specific 
modes of calculation that reflect their specific interests. For those not directly affected by a 
current crisis, learning in crisis occurs through real time observation of the relevant 
phenomenal forms. This is often mediated through diverse forms of representation (serious and 
tabloid journalism, statistics, charts, econometric models, reports, etc.) and can be highly 
mediatized (MacKenzie 2009; Engelen et al. 2011; Tetlock 2007; Pahl 2011; on mediatization, 
Hajer 2011). Specific forms of visualization and media representations typically vary across 
popular, serious, and specialist media. In no case, by definitional fiat, does learning in crisis 
dig below surface phenomena to deeper causes, crisis-tendencies, and so on. 
 
Learning about crisis occurs with lags in real time as a crisis unfolds, often in unexpected ways, 
and as the routine crisis-management measures resorted to by actors prove (or seem to be) 
inadequate or inappropriate. Common sense and/or instituted social imaginaries typically 
ignore key features of the actually existing natural and social world. In capitalist economies, 
for example, these features include: contradictions, dilemmas, crisis-tendencies and counter-
tendencies; important extra-economic conditions of existence and effects of economic practices 
and institutions; and the uneven links across different scales of economic action and their 
embedding in broader spatio-temporal frameworks. These features operate even when they are 
unacknowledged by first-order social agents (and/or are denied by observers) and, because of 
their interaction in specific contexts and conjunctures, may generate crisis-tendencies or 
otherwise disorient agents and observers, prompting the occasion for learning more about the 
facticity of the natural and social worlds. For those directly affected, this occurs when attention 
turns from phenomenal forms to deeper causes and dynamics and their bearing on crisis 
management. Trial-and-error experimentation through efforts at crisis-management is a key 
element of learning about the nature of the crisis. In financial crises, for example, this is 
possible for those directly tasked with crisis-management (e.g., central bankers, international 
financial institutions, key figures in the political executive, and regulators) and/or those able to 
guide the official approach to crisis-management, whether by reinforcing hegemonic or 
dominant paradigms or reviving, reinventing, or relaying plausible alternatives. These lessons 
are rarely purely technical or instrumental but are also shaped by the changing political 
conjuncture (broadly defined) in which efforts to manage the crisis occur (cf. Poulantzas 1979; 




For those without the power to translate construals directly into policy, key mediating roles in 
the process of learning about crisis are played by financial, economic, and political journalists 
alongside such ‘usual suspects’ as research institutes, think tanks, vested economic interests, 
lobbies, and academics. Not all actors or observers move to this stage because it involves not 
only interpretive power but also the capacity to translate construals into authoritative action. 
An interesting example of this is Hyman Minsky’s analysis of the role of speculative and Ponzi 
finance in financial crises, leading him to ask whether “it” can happen again (Minsky, 1982). 
Without the authority to translate his observations into policy, the role of Ponzi finance in 
particular had to be relearnt in the North Atlantic Financial Crisis, when policy-makers and 
commentators rediscovered the “Minsky moment” (for further discussion, see Rasmus, 2010). 
Learning about crisis may also occur among those who seek to resist, subvert or redirect official 
responses and/or to develop alternative approaches that do not rely on access to the ‘official’ 
levers of power, including the ability to resort to ‘exceptional’ measures. In either case, such 
learning is typically highly selective, partial, and provisional as well as mediated and 
mediatized. Finally, for retrospective learning about crisis, whether interested or disinterested, 
lessons may well draw on contemporary accounts. 
 
The ‘unmarked’ and ‘unobserved’ take their revenge on those who ignore them, and this leads 
to crisis or other system failures. This is where learning about crisis and its roots in the 
unacknowledged matter. For in this analytically distinct (but not necessarily sequentially 
distinct) phase of crisis construal and management, these processes are more experimental as 
actors seek to make sense of the crisis not merely at the phenomenal level but also in terms of 
underlying mechanisms and crisis dynamics. For those directly affected, this occurs when 
attention turns from phenomenal forms to deeper causes and dynamics and their bearing on 
crisis management. For ‘outside’ observers, it occurs when they focus on real causes, dynamics, 
effects and monitor actors’ trial-and-error attempts to solve crisis and/or how other ‘outsiders’ 
seek to shape its course, costs, outcome. Not all actors or observers can or do move to this stage 
and it is typically highly selective, partial, and provisional as well as mediated and mediatized. 
 
Learning from crisis occurs later, as crisis-management efforts succeed, or recovery takes place 
for other reasons, and actors reflect on the crisis and its import for future crises and crisis-
management. Whether one has directly experienced the crisis or ‘merely’ observed it in real 
time, learning from crisis occurs after ‘it’ ends. Learning from a crisis can also occur through 
institutionalized inquiries, based on reports from those who experienced it, observed it, and 
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tried to describe, interpret, and explain it. This is an important mechanism of policy learning 
for future crisis prevention and crisis management. In contrast to learning in and about crisis, 
learning from crises may happen much later based on lessons drawn from other times and/or 
places. Such studies may be limited to iconic, high profile, or benchmark crises or aim to be 
more comprehensive. Relevant comparators and appropriate lessons are often disputed, as 
demonstrated by the continuing debate on the 1930s Great Depression. , the genealogy and 
impact of which is endlessly contested, revisited, and revised because of the changing interests 
at stake. 
 
Learning from crisis may shape policies and individual and collective strategies in two ways. 
First, lessons learnt by those directly affected can be conveyed in more or less codified terms 
to others who experience similar crises. This may lead to fast policy and/or strategy transfer, 
whether appropriate or not. Because learning and normal politics both ‘take time’, crises create 
pressure to act based on unreliable information, narrow or limited consultation and 
participation. Calls for quick action lead to shorter policy development cycles, fast-tracking 
decision-making, rapid programme rollout, continuing policy experiments, institutional and 
policy Darwinism, constant revision of guidelines, and so on. An emphasis on speed affects 
the choice of policies, initial policy targets, sites where policy is implemented, and the criteria 
adopted for success. It also discourages proper evaluation of a policy’s impact over various 
spatio-temporal horizons, including delayed and/or unintended consequences and feedback 
effects. 
 
Second, lessons drawn by ‘outside’ observers may be conveyed to those directly affected as 
more or less codified guidance for managing future crises. However, there is many a slip 
between the discursive resonance of old, reworked, or new imaginaries in a given conjuncture 
and their translation into adequate policies, effective crisis-management routines, durable new 
social arrangements, and institutionalized compromises to support renewed accumulation. 
Indeed, codification of knowledge can backfire where it is followed too rigidly without regard 
to the tacit knowledge and improvisation that also shaped crisis-management. The one-size-
fits-all lessons of bodies such as the IMF illustrate this and can be contrasted with the very 
different lessons drawn from Iceland’s handling of its disastrous liquidity and solvency crises 
– and, indeed, with the recent admission by the IMF that it had underestimated the impact of 
austerity on debt-default-deflation dynamics. Very different lessons can be drawn from how 
Iceland handled its financial crises against IMF advice (Sigfússon 2012); and the IMF has 
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admitted that it had underestimated austerity’s impact on debt-default-deflation dynamics 
(Blanchard & Leigh 2013). 
 
Lessons from the past can be invoked in all three types of learning. Sometimes this involves 
seeking good historical parallels to guide crisis responses in real time – with the risk of drawing 
false analogies and/or missing novel features. Even clear parallels may not alert policy-makers 
to the risks involved in following failed policies. Thus Boyer (this volume) notes that the Baltic 
States repeated the errors that contributed to the 1997 East Asian crises by incurring large debts 
in foreign currency. Lessons from the past can also be deliberately invoked to steer crisis 
construal toward one rather than another set of crisis measures (on historical parallels, see 
Samman 2013). 
 
Reflections on learning in, about, and from crises has spawned a huge literature on crisis 
management, intervention, and communication. But this adopts a mainly instrumental position 
with limited implications for developing the critique of political economy. On this last point, it 
is worth recalling Karl Deutsch’s aphorism that power is the ability not to have to learn from 
one’s mistakes (1963, 111). In other words, elites may try to impose the costs of their mistakes 
onto others as well as to shape learning processes and, in particular to control ex post inquiries 
into crises and lessons drawn therefrom. For, given asymmetrical power relations, crises may 
also lead to the re-assertion of old ideas and values, policy paradigms, and routines 
(traditionalism, reaction, restoration). This remark highlights structural and strategic 
asymmetries that might influence both policy and political learning. Learning may not be 
translated into new policies: “identifying lessons” is not the same as “acting on them” and many 
factors can interfere here. Agents may lack the capacity (technologies, suitable leverage points, 
or access to power) to act on lessons learnt; the powerful may block action where they believe 
it might hurt their interests. There are many other causes of learning failure. These include 
drawing simplistic conclusions, fantasy lessons, falsely generalized lessons, turbulent 
environments that quickly render lessons irrelevant, rhetorical learning, limits on learning due 
to prior political or policy commitments, politicized learning that reflects power relations, and 
ideological or social barriers that block active learning. In addition, as noted above, codified 






Crises are potentially path-shaping moments that provoke responses that are mediated through 
semiotic-cum-material processes of variation, selection, and retention. A critical realist 
approach to crises that takes seriously their duality – objectively overdetermined, subjectively 
indeterminate – must combine structural and semiotic analyses. It would examine: (1) how 
crises emerge when established patterns of dealing with structural contradictions, their crisis-
tendencies, and strategic dilemmas no longer work as expected and, indeed, when continued 
reliance thereon may even aggravate matters; (2) how contestation over the meaning of the 
crisis shapes responses through processes of variation, selection, and retention that are 
mediated through a changing mix of semiotic and extra-semiotic mechanisms. This approach 
opens space for studying the variation, selection, and retention of crisis construals and policy 
lessons as crises develop. Crisis construals establish ‘truth effects’, i.e., the hegemonic or 
dominant meanings of crisis result from power relations. They are not the outcome of a co-
operative language game with fixed rules but of a political struggle with variable rules and 
contested stakes (Lecercle, 2006, p. 98). In this sense, construals are not simple linguistic (re-
)descriptions of a conjuncture but, when backed by powerful social forces, involve strategic 
interventions into that conjuncture.  
 
The mechanisms of variation, selection, and retention that privilege some crisis construals over 
others and some crisis lessons over others produce particular “modes of crisis management” 
that are not dictated solely by the objective overdetermination of the crisis nor by “arbitrary, 
rationalistic, and willed” construals of this, that, or another social force. At stake here is the 
production of “truth effects” that are not so much scientifically valid as pragmatically correct 
in specific conjunctures. In other words, these construals offer a sound objective analysis in 
terms of the correlation of forces as well as underlying causes and can gauge and guide the 
strategic horizons of action, organizing effective action and disorganizing opposition. In 
general, then, learning in, about, and from crises is relevant to the critique of political economy, 







1 On the important distinction between crises as events or processes, see Forgues and Roux-
Dufort (1998). 
2 In foreign and military affairs, ‘false flag’ operations are attempts to manufacture crises and 
provide a casus belli. Analogous activities occur in other fields. 
3 Such empiricist approaches are criticized by Rasmus 2010. 
4 For a less complex, but still important (and widely-cited), discussion of crisis as event vs 
crisis as process, see Forgues and Roux-Dufort 1998. 
5 In practice, however, counter-cyclical policies were often badly executed, proved /pro-
cyclical, and, over time, led to stagflation. 
6 Imaginary refers here to sets of cultural elements common to a given social group (or groups) 
that shape ‘lived experience’ and help to reproduce social relations. 
7 ‘Signum … est res praeter speciem quam ingerit sensibus, aliud aliquid ex se faciens in 
cogitationem venire’ (cited Favareau 2006: 4) 
8 There is some debate about the appropriate translation of signa data regarding whether the 
emphasis is on the intention behind the use of the sign or its conventional linguistic character 
(see Jackson 1968: 13-15).  For present purposes, this is irrelevant because my focus is on signa 
naturalia, where intention is absent.  
9 This is analogous to the distinction drawn by Wallis and Brian Dollery (1999, p. 5) between 
scientific and policy paradigms: “In essence, policy advisers differentiate policy paradigms 
from theoretical paradigms by screening out the ambiguities and blurring the fine distinctions 
characteristic of theoretical paradigms” (1999, p. 5). 
10 ‘The study of possible futures must be grounded on the analysis of causally efficacious geo-
historical layers of reality – agency, structures and mechanisms’ (Patomäki 2008: xiii). 
11 The whole note is interesting because it distinguishes empirical features, the crisis as event 
and process, and its underlying causes considered as crisis-tendencies and counter-tendencies. 
12 This notion was introduced by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (1987), who uses it to describe 
the discursive construction of an ‘essential unity’ among heterogeneous groups as a basis for 
strategic political action in relation to nationalities, ethnic groups, gender politics and other 
movements. It can be generalized to other forms of though and action oriented to strategic 
interventions. 
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